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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RUTH MARKS,
Plaintiff - Respondent,
-vs.CONTINENTAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, a foreign
nrnurance company,
Defendant - Appclla,nt.

Case
No.10656

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals from a decision of the court which
was on the merits after hearing all of the evidence that
either party cared to produce. It ruled that the policy
of insurance which the plaintiff had obtained from defendant was in force at the time she received a medical
treatment for which she seeks recovery and found that
there was no fraud or misstatement by plaintiff with intention to deceive or mislead the defendant, and further
found tlrnt the misstatements that were contained did not
affect the risk or materially contribute to the eventual
condition requiring medical attention.
1

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LO-WER COURT
This case was tried to the court sitting without a jury
who found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant after considering the evidence presented by
both of the parties.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have this court find as a matter of
law that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is unable to agree with the statement of
facts as contained in defendant's brief and rather than
try and correct such statement, will restate the facts with
the purpose in mind of giving to the court a narrative
statement accurately presenting the evidence on which
the trial court relied in finding in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant.
Plaintiff and her two sons are the insureds on hvo
policies of insurance issued by defendant with an effective
day of May 27, 1963. The hvo policies are Exhibits P-1
and P-2. The policies are the usual form of policy providing for coverage on medical and surgical expenses and
plaintiff's claim is only for the actual medical and surg-ical expense which was incurred.
The policies were purchased by the plaintiff's former
husband, Jerome Marks, father of the two children, '"hose
names are Loren and David Marks. Exhibit D-6, a let-

ter from defendant's agent, states that these policies had
been purchased. There was forwarded forms for plaintiff Ruth Marks to fill out.
Mrs. Marks did not fill out the forms furnished to
her, but simply signed one and returned it to the agent
for defendant at Tulsa, Oklahoma (R. 29). She wrote a
letter to her relative, Mr. Borofsky, with the application
and related the various items of past medical history, including the fact that she had an operation on her coccyx
bone in 1954 (R. 31). Prior to the time the policy with
defendant was purchased, plaintiff had been employed by
the Lorraine Press for a period of twelve years and had
Blue Cross and Blue Shield coverage there (R. 31). There
were a few months, January, February, March and April
and the first 27 days of May, 1963, when no coverage was
in existence on plaintiff and her children. During the
period of time when defendant claims the physical condition affecting its policy existed, plaintiff had Blue Cross
and Blue Shield (R. 32). When the policies of insurance
were received they had attached to them the applications
which had been filled in over the signature of Mrs. Marks,
but she did not examine them closely enough to notice
what the information contained was (R. 34). After the
;:ipplication for insurance had been received and the policies issued, Mrs. Marks continued to work on a survey
campaign for her ex-husband, Jerome Marks. She worked
from about the first of May through the middle of August, 1963, conducting a telephone survey. The work required her to start at 8 :00 o'clock in the morning and
work until 10 :00 at night. It consisted of general office
work, superYising 80 girls, and caring for payrolls and
3

other necessary information. It required Mrs. l\Iarks to
be on her feet all the time. From May through August,
1963, there were no symptoms of any kind in l\frs. Marks'
back and no pain (R. 52). After she completed the '"·ork
in August she went on vacation and did not work. A few
days before Thanksgiving, in the nighttime, she awoke
unable to move her right leg and right hip and the side of
her face was numb. She was afraid that something was
wrong in her right leg, but disregarded the conditioll:s
and went on a trip to visit her family in California without seeking medical attention. While there her mothrr
suggested that she obtain medical attention (R. 53). Sbr
did not see a doctor and the pain in her back was intermittent during December and January of 1963. Prior to
November, 1963, other than back strain type of pain resulting from extra work, Mrs. Marks had no backache
similar in kind to the pain she suffered after ThanksgiYing of 1963. She saw the first doctor relating to her backache in January, 1964, when she consulted Dr. Karavitis,
a neurosurgeon (R. 55). Dr. Kara vi tis recommended
that she see Dr. Lamb. The operation was performed in
April, 1964 on Mrs. Marks' hack.
Mrs. Marks testified that the pain in her right le~~,
for which she was operated, had not been present in Jn1y,
1955, when she consulted Dr. Lamh. This was a pain in
the left leg and primarily in the coccyx area of her lmttocks where she had had her coccyx hone removed ( R. FiG).
Dr. Robert Lamb testified on behalf of defendant.
His examination of Mrs. Marks at the time of the operation revealed that she had a protrnding hnt not a rup4

tured disc. (Lamb Depo. P. 13.) His record revealed that
on i\f arch 11, 1964, Mrs. l\farks stated that her chief complaint was pain in the low back and right leg which had
been present for some few weeks and was getting worse.
(Lamb Depo. P. 15.) Counsel for defendant asked Dr.
Lnmh to assume that if plaintiff had intermittent pain for
nine years, whether or not the operation in April, 1964,
\ms connected to the early condition observed in 1955 by
Dr. Chapman. The doctor stated that he would be of tlw
opinion that it resulted from the trauma she sustained
in February, 1955, but further stated that the continued
symptoms since the time in 1955 and that reoccurring intermittent symptoms were the important connecting link.
(Lamb Depo. P. 9.) The doctor further testified that as
long as the disc which he removed protruded and applied
pressure on the nerve, the person would receive pain.
(Lamb Depo. P. 11) and that the pain and the pressure
were related as cause and effect. Dr. Lamb stated that
the coccygectomy was in no way related to the ultimate
operi'ltion for the bulging disc. (Lamb Depo. P. 11.) When
counsel for defendant asked Dr. Lamb to assume that
1\Irs. Marks had had intemittent back pain during the full
nine years between 1955 and 1964, the assumption was
denied as being a true state of facts by counsel for plaintiff (Lamb Depo. P. 19-20), and the doctor made the
following answer after counsel for defendant's questions:
''Assuming these facts that yon h:we related to
me, I think 0112 has to sn~T that the injury that she
had did pla~T some part in the intermittent, continued intermittent pain that she had which eventnall~T rcqnirecl surgenT, if this patient had no pain
of thi8 type prior to i11jury or assuming this pa-
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tient had no pain of this type prior to injury.''
(Lamb Depo. P. 20.)
Counsel for plaintiff asked the doctor to assume that
the pain in the back had not been intermittent, but that
she had had a pain-free back between 1955 and until a few
weeks before March, 1964, what effect this as~mmption
would have on his opinion and the doctor then answered
as follows:

'' vV ell, I certainly wouldn't be sure - had the
patient had a period of symptom free period for
several years I wouldn't be sure what part the injury played on the eventual disc protrusion,
whether it was severe enough to set up a degenerative process it might have in some way influenced
the eventual protrusion or whether it was inconseqential." (Lamb Depo. P. 20-21.)
(Q) "I suppose it would be true, would it not, Dr.
Lamb, that the longer the period of pain free back,
the less likelihood that the original injury caused
the final protrusion or the smaller the effect of the
original injury on the final protrusion?''

(A) "Yes, I think this is true."
The evidence from Mrs. Marks was that she did have
a long period of pain-free back from 1955 to 1963. During
this period of time she worked hard, had an automobile
accident which affected the nerve in her elbow, but dirl
not have any reoccurrence of the back pain in the area of
the coccyx or left leg. The pain which came on in November, 1963, was in her right leg. She has hacl no further symptoms even to the present time relating- to pain
in the left leg.
6

The information contained in the application for insurance was actually placed on the application by the
Magoon Agency and possibly by Mr. Borof sky, who was
a relative of the plaintiff. The necessary information
'ms furnished to Mr. Borofsky by letter, telephone conversations, as well as through his familiarity with plaintiff's family and her physical condition (R. 43-44). The
general agent for defendant testified that 99% of the applications such as were submitted in this case are :filled in
by the insurance company agent. The information is obtained from the person applying for insurance and put
on the application by the agent. It is the duty of the
agent to obtain the information as accurately as possible
and to fill in the application as accurately as possible, interpreting the same on behalf of his insurance company.
(See deposition of Harry B. Magoon.)
The trial court found that the application was filled
in by the agents of Continental Casualty Company, was
based on information which the plaintiff had furnished to
him, both from personal acquaintance and correspondence and telephone calls, found that there was no intention on the part of the plaintiff or any of the agents of
Magoon and Associates to deceive or defraud the defendant, that all parties engaged or taking part in the
preparation of the application believed the information
thereon contained was accurate and correct.
Court found in accordance with the evidence of plaintiff that the pain in her left leg, which she had suffered in
1055, was not the pain which she suffered in the right
lrg in 1963, that her condition for which she was ulti7

mately operated on commenced more than thirty day:;
after the 27th of l\fay, 1963. rrhe court further fon11cl tlint
the fall in 1955 and the automobile aceitlc11t in 1!l::i7 1\·ere
in no way related to the conditioll which y)lai11tiff wac;
operated on for on April 3, 1964, nor dicl these incidents
increase the hazard for ~which the defendant issnrd its
policies to plaintiff and the minor children.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The evidence substantially supports each firnli112: ilrnt
the trial court made. One of the places ~where there is
confusion and some evidence on lwth sides of a basic
question relates to the history of the plaintiff's condition
as contained in the medical record. Dr. Laml1's reconl
dated March 11, 1964, under" History" states as follows:
"This patient states that she has had some soreness in her low back and right hip for some fow
weeks and it is getting 1vorse." (F,xhihit D-8)
On the hospital record under the initial PI there is written, "nine years PTA this patient had a severe fall, landing on her huttocks. Since that time she has 11ml intermittent lffw back pain, sometimes so seYere that she <''1 11 "t
get out of heel. She has had pain in the right hip am!
paresthenas down the entire right leg for past 41 ::
months." (Exhibit 1) J\Irs. l\Iarks denied tlrnt the iwrso11
8

maki11g the note on the hospital record had correctly interpreted what she hacl told. The intermittent low hack
pain had only be0n since November and \Vas the problem
for 4% months prior to the operation rather than nine
years. This statl>ment is consistent with the history as
contained in Dr. Lamb's office records. Both records
were made before the claim which the plaintiff makes
arose.
The trial court chose to believe Mrs. :Marks and to
accept Dr. Lamb's office record ·where it was in conflict
with the statement on the hospital record. It is respectfully suhmittecl that this determinaion by the trial court
on a disputed question of fact is entirely proper and supported hy substantial evidence.
Defendant seeks to def end the claim of plaintiff on
the ground that the insurance policy was obtained by
fraudulent representations relating to the plaintiff's
physical condition and past medical history. The court
fournl that the1·e was no intention on the part of any of
tl1c parties ·who ·were involved in the preparation of the
application to deceive or defraud the defendant, that the
p:nties answered the questions with information thc.'' hc1ievecl \YRS aceura te and correct. This finding is snnportecl hy snhstantial evidence and no substantial contrar.'' e\'iclcnce is presented.
Defendant cites the two accidents tlrnt the plaintiff
had hacl as lieing i11 some way material, bnt the t0stimo11y
of D1·. Lamb was that the coccygectomy "\Yas in no way a
factor i11 the ultimate com1ition for which he operated
~)

on Mrs. l\Iarks in April, 1064. The accident i11 ·which she
had had the nerve in her arm injured was likewise immaterial. Her condition in 1964 ·was in no way the result
of, nor was the condition contributed to bv either one of
these accidents.
An ordinary individual, it is respectfully submitted,
would not consider that these accidents created a disorder or disease or were items which would in any way
increase the risk or hazard to the insurance company.
Apparently this conclusion was one \Yhich the insurance
agent himself came to since he was aware of the history
of his uncle's former wife at the time the application
was filled out. The end result was that these items did
not in any way contribute to plaintiff's physical disability which created the claim. No questions were asked
concerning accidental injury. Plaintiff had suffered two
accidents in her lifetime, in 1954 and 1957. Neither, as
far as she knew, left her with any disorders. None of
the treatments or hospitalizations had occurred within
five years from date of application so the ans·wer to
question 11 is in no way inaccurate.
The burden of proof that plaintiff engaged in fraudulent conduct in the procurement of the insurance policy would rest upon the defendant, and it is respectfu11y
submitted that there is not only not substantial proof of
such conduct on the part of the plaintiff, hut then" is no
evidence of any kind that would support such a finding
by the trial court.
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POINT II
THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
UTAH LAW.
1

This court in a very carefully considered opm1on,
Wootton v. Combined Insurance Company of America,
16 Utah 2nd 52, 395 P. 2d 724, set down the rule which
plaintiff believes is determinative of this appeal. The
trial court followed it in granting plaintiff judgment.
'rhere, as here, the insurance company sought to avoid
liability and the payment of a claim by alleging misrepresentations in the negotiation of the insurance policy.
The court held:
"Unless the misrepresentations in the negotiation
for an insurance policy are made with the intent
to deceive and 'materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the
insurer' the insurance contract cannot be avoided
by an insurance company. Mere falsity of answers to questions propounded are insufficient if
not knowingly made with intent to deceive and
defraud."
rrhe TV ootton decision was based on two applicable
sources of law. Sec. 31-19-8, U.C.A. 1953 and prior decided cases.
Plaintiff agrees with the defendant's statement that
Section 31-19-8, U.C.A. 1953 is the applicable statute of
State of Utah and also agrees that she has the burden
to prove that she did not intend to deceive the insurance
company.
11

31-19-8, U.C.A. provides that no misrepresentati011

shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the colltrad
unless the misrepresentation was made with the intent
to deceive. The testimony of plaintiff was that slw
did not believe any of the representations were false or
that at the time she made the answers to the ag-e11t relating
to hers and her children's medical history there was any
misrepresentations. True, she had snffered two aeeiclelltal injuries from which she belie;-t'cl she ha(l fnll~T reeoverd and which injuries, on the 15th of l\Ia~-, 1063, ).f rs.
Marks did not belie\-e had caused her any disorders.
Question 11 on the application seems to set the tone
of the other prior questions in that it asks a general qurstion, ''Have you or any dependent named had medical or
surgical advice or treatment or been hospital confined
during the past five years other than stated above?"
The injuries that 1\frs. l\f arks had received, the hospitalization, surgical advice, had all been more than fin'
years before the 15th of May, 1963. This qncstion ;ms
answered "no" and correctl~r so.
To the hest of l\[rs. l\Iark'l knowledge the other answer to question lOF was roned. She believed that the
accidental injuries which she had recei Hcl would 11ot lw
classified as ''arthritis, rhenmatism, hack, spine, hone,
joint, or muscle disorder.''
The normal interpretation of this qnestio11 10 F
would he set hv the first ·words of the question, "arthritis, rheumatism," or some otlwr clisease of t hr back, arnl
thr aecidental injuries that l\Irs. Marke; hacl rrccin•tl

12

1

would not be such items or disorders. It was her position that the application was answered honestly.
There is some indication that the defendant claims
that the claim of Mrs. Marks for workman's compensation made as a result of her accidental injury on Decemher 6, 1957, would in some way have been material and
that the failure to disclose this accident would have affected the insurable risk undertaken by defendant.
This was an accident in which plaintiff's left arm
was injured and she had a nerve paralysis in the arm resulting from a puncture wound. As in the case of the
coccyx removal, this injury had no bearing whatsoever
on the ultimate protrusion of her intervertebral disc
causing nerve pressure and even though its concealment
were found to be fraudulent and intentional, it would be
immaterial.
The early Utah case of Chadwick v. Beneficial J,ife
fosurance Company, 54 Utah 443, 181 P. 448, involved
the issuance of a policy of insurance to an insured who
believed he had rheumatism. His pain had been diagHosed by his attending physician as rheumatism. It was
eventually discovered to be tuberculosis of the spine and
was the actual cause of his death. This court there held
for a misrepresentation in the negotiation of an insurance contract to be the basis of avoiding the policy, it
must have been made ·with the intention to decei\'e.
Plaintiff elaims that none of the misrepresentations,
if such there were, could be material. Dr. Lamb dearly
testified that the cocc~'X operation did not in any way

contribute to Mrs. Marks' protruding disc. Certainly it
could not be claimed that the prior automobile accident
which caused the nerve involvement in her arm contributed to her bulging intervertebral disc.
At the time of trial defendant didn't make any such
claim, and it is quite obvious that the condition for
which Mrs. Marks was operated was not the kind of
condition that she had following her accident immediately after the coccyx operation. There the pain was
in the left leg and the root-nerve pressure which started
in November, 1963, was in the right leg. These conditions cannot be the same, pressure on the nerve is the
pain producing factor, and when the pressure is released
the pain subsides.
An early Utah case following Chadwick v. Beneficial
Life Insura;nce Company (supra) is New York Life Insurance Company v. Grow, 103 Utah 285, 135 P. 2d, 120.
In this instance a material misrepresentation was contained in the application. The representation related
to whether or not the insured had heart trouble. The
insured had had a heart attack, which was so diagnosed
and for which he had been treated. It was the result of
an accident and over-exertion in an attempt to escape
from an earth cavein. The insured had related to
the agent for the insurance company the fact of
the accident. The agent denied that he considered
it important or realized that it was an injury whirh
created a heart condition.
The trial court fonrnl
that the insured did not intend to deceive the insurance company since he had mentioned the accide11t
14

and the interpretation placed on his statement by the
insurance company's agent was not the responsibility of
the insured. Recovery was sustained on behalf of the
beneficiary of the insured. In the case now before the
court, a similar situation exists. Mrs. Marks revealed
to her ex-husband's nephew the information relating to
her physical condition and in addition, he was closely
associated with her family during the time when the
various accidents happened and the resultant treatments
received. His translation and interpretation of this information certainly could not be held to be the plaintiff's
responsibility. There was no evidence that the agent had
any intention to deceive his employer. In the absence of
evidence of that kind of conduct on his part, it must be
presumed that he acted in good faith.
In Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
108 F. 2d 902, 10 CCA, there were several misstatements
about the insured 's employment, place of residence,
length of time at residence, length of time he had been
employed in a grocery store, his occupation for the past
five years, but these misrepresentations were found by
the jury not to have been made with the intention to deceive or defraud the insurance company. The insurance
company's agent, one Cayias, had known the insured
Orfanis, knew that he did not live at his place of employment in the grocery store, and knew of his general habits
at the time the application was taken and the policy of
insurance delivered. The Circuit Court affirmed the jury
\'erdict for the insured and stated the law of Utah based
on the Chadwick v. Beneficial Life case, i.e. that misrepresentations, even of material facts, would not void an

insurance policy unless it was 0stablishecl that they were
kno-wingly made with intent to deceive and defraud.
An additional case has been up to the Tenth Circuit recently where the information furnished to the insurance agent did not find its way on to the applicatio11
·which he filled out and had the insured sign. This casr
is Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Willsey,
214 F. 2d 729, 10 CCA. In this case the insured advised
the agent of a past history of being hit on the head in a
baseball p.;ame and of having had dizzy spells. The agent
said unless there had been some recc>nt trouble from this,
it was immaterial and did not reveal this particular problem on the applicatiou. The insured died in the l1athroom with a bruise on his head and water in his lungs.
Death, it ·was found, was accidental. Even thou!;?,"h the
agent had no authority to vary the terms of the policy,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the 7,nlintakis ruling relating to Utah law and held that undrr
Utah law no misrepresentation could defeat or avoid a
policy of insurance unless made ·with intent to deceiw
and there could be no intention to deceive where the past
history was revealed to the insurance company's agent.
The agent, in translation of the answers and interpretin.g
them for the purpose of the application, would insulate
the insured against any claim by the company that he
intended to deceive the company and had failed to reveal
his medical history.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that if any misreprrsentations are containeel in the application of insuranrr,
they are on immaterial matters aml ·were not made ·with
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any intent to deceive and the mere falsity of the answers
are insufficient to justify avoidance of the insurance policy by defendant.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's disposition of the present matter is proper, that the findings of fact are supported by evidence of a substantial
nature, and the legal principles have been correctly applied. The judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this -------------------------------- day of
--- --- -- ---- ---- -------- -- -- ------------ ---- -- --.. , 1966.
DWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff
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